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Abstract
A shift is taking place in the religious field from collective, institutional, and 
tradition-bound religion to increasingly individual, non-institutional, and 
post-traditional religious forms. This article examines how the sociology of 
religion has responded to this empirical development, paying special attention to 
two issues to which Meerten Ter Borg has contributed, namely the typologiza-
tion of the various modes of non-institutional religion and the foundation of 
non-institutional religion in human nature. I suggest that the sociology of non-
institutional religion can advance, particularly if it adopts a substantial defini-
tion of religion, opens up for co-operation with cognitive scholars, and turns its 
attention to religious bricolage, the modes of belief, and the effect of the internet 
on non-institutional religion.
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1. This article is a revised and expanded version of a presentation entitled “The Con-
cept of Non-institutional Religion” that I gave at the symposium Implicit Religion, 
Non-institutional Religion and Beyond in Leiden, the Netherlands on April 20th, 2012 
at the occasion of the retirement of Prof. Dr. Meerten Ter Borg. Thanks are due 
to Edward Bailey, the members of the NOSTER Network Group on Alternative 
Spirituality, and the LOBOCOP members at the department for Cultural Sociology 
at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, for comments on an earlier version of this 
article.
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Introduction
A hundred years ago, this year, two great books were published which 
did much to define the identity of the sociology of religion: Les formes 
élémentaires de la vie religieuse (Durkheim 1912), and Die Soziallehren 
der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen (Troeltsch 1931 [1912]). The issues 
treated in these classics—religion’s relation to society and morality (Dur-
kheim), and the variety of Christianity’s institutional forms (Troeltsch)—
still constitute important areas of research within the sociology of religion, 
situating the discipline between anthropology and church history. That 
is to say, since its inception the sociology of religion has been interested 
primarily in religion at the level of society rather than at the individual 
level, and in religion in its official and institutional forms rather than in its 
non-institutional, spontaneous, and liquid forms. 
The over-emphases on the collective and the institutional within the 
sociology of religion cannot be blamed on Durkheim and Troeltsch, 
however, for both noted that a shift was taking place, in their own time, 
towards the individual and the non-institutional.2 Durkheim prophesied 
the emergence of a “cult of the individual,” and Troeltsch pointed out 
that, besides “Church Religion” and “Sect Religion,” another individual-
ized, undogmatic, tolerant, and experience-centred mode existed which he 
referred to as “Spiritual and Mystic Religion.” Troeltsch considered this 
religious mode to be the “secret religion of the educated classes” (1931 
[1912], 794) of his time, and a form of religion especially adapted to the 
conditions of modernity. 
During the twentieth century, and especially since the 1960s, the shift 
identified by these giants has progressed with increasing speed. Indeed, a 
process of subjectivization is visible in two major developments within the 
religious field in the Western world.
First of all, clergy, tradition, and dogma have suffered a loss of author-
ity within Christianity, leading to de-Christianization (people de-con-
verting from Christianity), de-ecclesialization (people leaving the church, 
but staying Christians), and the growth of various subjectivized forms 
of Christianity, relying on individual experience and rational reflection 
rather than on religious authority. Such subjectivized Christianity can be 
found both inside and outside the churches. It encompasses firstly, both 
Steven Sutcliffe’s “singular,” tradition-confined seekers (2004, 475), Peter 
Berger’s and Anton Zijderveld’s doubt-praising and Kierkegaard-inspired 
2. Responsible, instead, are the many theologians (i.e. representatives of collective and 
institutional religion) who have so strongly influenced the sociology of religion.
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Protestantism (2009), and secondly the popular, individualist, and utilitar-
ian faith mode identified as “Moralistic Therapeutic Deism” by Christian 
Smith and Melissa Denton (2005, 162–163), a mode which is predomi-
nant among American Christian teenagers, and probably among adults 
and non-Christians as well (Smith and Denton 2005, 166).3
Second, a non-institutional and detraditionalized religious field has 
emerged, referred to variously as “new age” (Hanegraaff 1996), “occulture” 
(Partridge 2004), “alternative spirituality” (Sutcliffe 2004), or the “holistic 
milieu” (Heelas and Woodhead 2005). It can be characterized as detradi-
tionalized (or post-traditional). because it takes place entirely outside the 
Christian tradition or at least freely combines Christian elements with 
non-Christian religion, alternative medicine, and alternative science. For 
this reason, the new field has been referred to as “post-Protestant” (Sut-
cliffe 2006) or “post-Christian” (Houtman and Aupers 2007). It has grown 
rapidly: from almost nothing in the 1960s, to a size where about 1–2% 
of the British population attended some activity of this sort during any 
given week in the early 2000s, according to Heelas and Woodhead (2005, 
40). This non-institutional, post-Christian field is populated by religious 
bricoleurs whose subject-centred and de-traditionalized religious mode 
of “Individualreligiosität” (Ahn 2007) can be seen as a popularized and 
de-Christianized form of Troeltsch’s Spiritual and Mystic Religion (cf. 
Campbell 1978).
Sociologists of religion, as well as colleagues in bordering disciplines, 
have been quick to recognize and investigate the new, non-institutional 
religious life. Many fine works have been produced by folklorists (e.g., 
Magliocco 2004), scholars of religion (e.g., Partridge 2004; Day 2011), 
anthropologists (e.g., Rubow 2000), sociologists of religion (e.g., Smith 
and Denton 2005), and media scholars (e.g., Clark 2003). 
However, two factors have stood in the way of the integration of these 
research initiatives into an integrated and self-conscious programme of 
research into non-institutional religion: that the work on non-institutional 
religion has been carried out in largely unconnected disciplinary and 
national contexts, and that most studies have had an ethnographic nature, 
3. Moralistic Therapeutic Deism is characterized by the following five propositions: 
“1. A god exists who created and ordered the world and watches over human life on 
earth. 2. God wants people to be good, nice, and fair to each other, as taught in the 
Bible and by most world religions. 3. The central goal of life is to be happy and to 
feel good about oneself. 4. God does not need to be particularly involved in one’s life 
except when God is needed to resolve a problem. 5. Good people go to heaven when 
they die” (Smith and Denton 2005, 162–163).
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aiming to describe and understand only a small portion of the non-insti-
tutional religious field. Even when these works go beyond a mere charting 
of the field and identify key categories and processes, their scope remains 
limited. Within the sociology of religion many a theoretical treatise has 
been devoted to non-institutional religion, but these have rarely treated 
the structure and dynamics of non-institutional religion, focusing instead 
on why we observe a process of deinstitutionalization in the first place.4 
What we still need is a research programme on non-institutional religion 
that combines the theoretical ambition of the sociology of religion with a 
focus on the constitution and dynamics of non-institutional religion itself, 
rather than on (only) the socio-historical conditions of its emergence.
While we wait for a strong, field-defining monograph, this article has 
the more modest aim of sketching some strong points in the existing lit-
erature on non-institutional religion, and of indicating a number of key 
issues that deserve more attention. I will proceed to do this in four stages. 
In the first section, I clarify what I mean by the “non-institutional religious 
field,” defining in turn the terms institution, religion, and field. The second 
and third sections are devoted to two theoretical issues of great importance 
for the sociology of non-institutional religion, namely the various modes 
of non-institutional religion and the foundation of non-institutional reli-
gion in human nature. Both issues have enjoyed Meerten Ter Borg’s atten-
tion, and I shall emphasize both Ter Borg’s contribution and the points 
in his position that can be developed further or should be complemented. 
In the fourth and final section, I point out some lacunae in our knowledge 
about the structure and dynamics of the non-institutional religious field, 
encouraging more research on religious bricolage, the modes of belief, and 
the effect of the internet on non-institutional religion.
The definition of the non-institutional religious field
I agree with Jonathan Turner (1987) that, if scientific theorising is to have 
any analytical value, a fundamental prerequisite is clear definitions of core 
concepts and categories. I think also, contrary to much “afterological”5 
methodology, that the same holds true for empirical investigations, includ-
4. Strong theories on secularization include Chaves (1994), Dobbelaere (2004), and 
Bruce (2011a). Heelas and Woodhead (2005) have taken us one step further with 
their convincing proposal that a “subjective turn” is the common factor behind both 
the decline of institutional Christianity and the rise of non-institutional religion 
(“spirituality”).
5. Jacqueline Mraz coined the term “afterological studies” to refer to postmodernism, 
poststructuralism, postcolonialism etc. (cf. Sahlins 1999, 416).
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ing qualitative studies. Before proceeding, it is therefore necessary to stip-
ulate the meaning of the terms “(non)-institutional,” “religion,” and “field.”
In the social sciences the concept “institution” (and its derivatives, “insti-
tutional” and “institutionalization,” etc.) can refer to (at least) two differ-
ent things. In the most straightforward meaning of the word, an institu-
tion is a formal organization. When I refer in this article to “institutional 
religion,” I mean religion which is institutional in this sense, i.e. religion 
that takes place within a formal organization such as the Roman Catho-
lic Church. Non-institutional religion, by contrast, is religion found outside 
formal organizations. 
In a second meaning of the term, which is associated especially with 
Arnold Gehlen (1940), institution refers to a taken-for-granted pro-
gramme for action. Institutions in this sense are the cultural counter-
parts of biological instincts insofar as they work automatically and non-
reflexively, but they can of course be changed or substituted in a way that 
instincts cannot. For Gehlen, institutionalization hence does not mean the 
instantiation of culture (including religion) into formal organizations, but 
the routinization or automation of certain action programmes. Deinsti-
tutionalization, by contrast, is the process by which formerly automized 
action programmes become de-automized and the object of conscious 
evaluation and reflection. 
Though terminologically confusing, it is highly relevant for the sociol-
ogy of non-institutional religion to identify the institutions (in Gehlen’s 
sense) of non-institutional religion (in the organizational sense). Such 
institutions include the notions that one should seek a “spirituality” that 
is authentic for me, and that all kinds of sources may be disembedded 
and recombined in the process, both of which ideas are held without any 
reflection or questioning by many non-institutional religionists (cf. Ham-
mer 2010; Houtman, Aupers, and de Koster 2011, Ch. 3).
Since the sociology of non-institutional religion seeks to identify reli-
gion in various unexpected places outside religious institutions, it needs 
furthermore a sound definition of religion so we know what we are look-
ing for. Broad, functionalistic definitions of religion like Clifford Geertz’s 
(1966, 4) can be useful for highlighting similarities between religion and 
religion-like phenomena, such as film (Lyden 2003), fan culture ( Jindra 
1994), football (Ter Borg 1998), and commitments (Bailey 1997). The 
potential weakness of such an approach, however, is to equate all that is 
meaningful, social, or important to people with religion, thereby overlook-
ing real differences and losing the opportunity to distinguish between the 
558  Markus Altena Davidsen
© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012
specifically religious and the generally social or cultural. For the sake of 
analytical clarity, I suggest the sociological study of non-institutional reli-
gion should avoid the functionalistic approach. 
We also cannot use a colloquial or nominalist “definition” which takes 
non-institutional religion to be simply those practices which participants 
themselves identify as “religious.” A nominalist approach would fail to 
capture much, for most religionists prefer to identify non-institutional 
religion as spirituality, magic, gnosis, or even science. It might also include 
too much, if it misinterprets such metaphorical expressions as “football is 
my religion.” 
The preferable starting point must therefore be a stipulative and sub-
stantive definition of religion. Strongly inspired by Steve Bruce,6 I sug-
gest we understand religion as activity (i.e. cognition, communication, and 
action) which assumes the existence of transempirical realities (e.g., otherworlds, 
Heaven), supernatural entities with power to act (e.g., gods, spirits), and/or 
impersonal processes or principles possessed of moral purpose (e.g., karma, ma’at). 
Exactly because such a definition contains no reference to the forms (e.g., 
the presence of a canon) and functions (e.g., securing or disrupting social 
cohesion) that are commonly associated with institutional religion, it is 
particularly suitable for identifying religion in unexpected places (outside 
of institutions), in unexpected guises (also, when parading as non-religion), 
and in unexpected modes (such as the casual and playful).
I have used the term “field” to refer to the religious field in general, to 
the non-institutional religious field in particular, and to “sub-fields” within 
it (e.g., the detraditionalized, post-Christian religious field), but I have not 
yet made clear what I mean by field. Let me remedy that now. By “field” I 
do not mean a champ in Bourdieu’s sense (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 
97), although analyses of power and of the distribution of capital are of 
course key concerns of the sociology of non-institutional religion. Rather, 
I use “field” to refer to the extension (in Frege’s sense) of a category, as 
opposed to its intension or stipulative definition. Where “non-institutional 
religion” has a double reference, namely to the extension of the category 
(i.e. to non-institutional religion in the actual world) and to the inten-
sion of the category (i.e. to the contents of my definition of it), the “non-
institutional religious field” refers always to the sum of non-institutional 
religion in the world. In other words, the non-institutional religious field, 
6. Bruce defines religion as “beliefs, actions and institutions which assume the existence 
of supernatural entities with powers of action, or impersonal powers or processes pos-
sessed of moral purpose” (2011b, 112).
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as an “activity field,” is constituted by all those instances of real activity that 
correspond to our ideal definition of non-institutional religion.
The constitution of the non-institutional religious field
Having now demarcated the non-institutional religious field, it is time 
to look more closely at what we find inside it. In this section, I review a 
number of typologies of contemporary religious modes and identify four 
modes that are found within the non-institutional religious field. Let me 
begin with Charles Glock’s and Robert Wuthnow’s “small” typology of 
“departures” from “conventional religion,” i.e. from official and institu-
tional church religion.7 Analysing the transformation of the American 
religious field in the late 1970s, Glock and Wuthnow observed three such 
departures, namely nominal religion (with continued cultural identification, 
but little or no belief and practice),8 various forms of alternative religion 
(with heterodoxy and heteropraxis), and complete non-religion (Glock and 
Wuthnow, 1979).9
Ter Borg (2004) has offered a more detailed typology of modern reli-
gious forms. Besides “autochthonous” (home-grown) and “allochthonous” 
(immigrant) “official religions,” Ter Borg identifies a number of “non-offi-
cial” or “wild” forms of religion. That these forms of religion are “wild” 
means that they have “no institutionalized bond to official religious groups 
or traditions” (2004, 116). There are four types: Alternative religions are 
the sects and new religious movements. They are non-official and non-
mainstream, but just as institutionalized and recognizable as religions, as 
are the official religions (Ter Borg 2004, 113–114). Sub-dogmatic religiosity 
is not linked to any specific religious institution or tradition. It is the reli-
7. The terminology is problematic because it suggests an original situation in which 
everyone belonged to conventional religion, a situation that never existed.
8. The term nominal religion/Christianity is unlucky (and controversial) because it 
seems to imply an opposition to a more “real” Christianity. Especially in a country 
like Britain, where “Christian nominalists” far outnumber church members and active 
church-goers, the term and its connotations of deviancy seem misplaced. That it is 
nevertheless possible to use “Christian nominalism” in an entirely neutral sense to 
refer simply to all self-identified, but “non-practising Christians,” is demonstrated by 
Day (2011). 
9. Arguably, Glock and Wuthnow mapped only the religious forms of the dominant 
Christian or Judeo-Christian cultural field. To capture also non-Christian, immigrant 
religion, it is necessary to expand their model with a number of independent cultural 
or ethnic fields besides the Judeo-Christian one. These ethnic fields are more than just 
alternatives from the point of view of the Christian majority. They each possess their 
own set of conventional, alternative, and nominal religious forms.
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gion of the unaffiliated spiritual bricoleurs who disembed beliefs and prac-
tices and recombine them on an ad hoc basis (Ter Borg 2004, 114–115). 
Optional religiosity is even less distinct. It is the vague belief in some higher 
power, a belief which usually has no impact on social life, but can be acti-
vated at crucial moments, such as marrying and dying. Ter Borg estimates 
that about half the Dutch population falls into this category (2004, 115). 
Finally, Ter Borg counts implicit religion, i.e. rituals, effervescence, cha-
risma, etc. embedded in non-religious traditions or institutions, as a form 
of wild religion (2004, 116).
The two typologies considered so far do not capture the fact that also 
observant church members tend to combine their orthopraxis with reli-
gious beliefs and practices outside the control of church authorities. In 
other words: that the religious life of such people typically includes also 
an unofficial dimension, variously referred to as folk religion (e.g., Bow-
man 2004), popular religion (e.g., Possamai 2009), and common religion 
(Towler 1974). Examples of such popular religion include the consultation 
of folk healers, belief in ghosts, and the devotion of uncodified, local saints. 
The notion that one can distinguish between an official and an unoffi-
cial aspect of a religion is, however, currently being challenged by Ameri-
can and Latin American sociologists and Catholicism scholars, includ-
ing Meredith McGuire (2008), Robert Orsi (2003), and Cristián Parker 
(1996). These scholars point out that (Latin) American Catholics consider 
the official and unofficial aspects of their religious life to be parts of one 
and the same religious tradition. This might well be so, but the situation 
is different in Protestant Northern Europe where much unofficial religion 
has become detraditionalized and even consciously anti-Christian. (Prot-
estant America seems to fall somewhere between these extremes). 
It seems therefore that we need to distinguish between two ideal-typical 
forms of popular religion: a traditionalized form, which religionists con-
sider part of a particular religious tradition, and a post-traditional form, 
synonymous with the sub-dogmatic religiosity identified by Ter Borg and 
the non-institutional and detraditionalized religious field identified in the 
introduction to this contribution.
We can now map the various ideal typical forms of institutional and 
non-institutional religion onto a simple continuum, from the more to 
the less institutionalized. First we have the various institutional religions, 
whether they are autochthonous or allochthnonous, mainstream or alter-
native. Then follow the forms of non-institutional religion that are con-
nected to a particular religious tradition. Within this category we can dis-
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tinguish between a manifest form, tradition-bound popular religion, and a 
latent form, nominal religion. Finally we have the detraditionalized forms 
of non-institutional religion discussed by Ter Borg, in its manifest form 
as sub-dogmatic religiosity and in its latent form as optional religiosity. 
The subject matter of the sociology of non-institutional religion, the non-
institutional religious field, is comprised by the two right-most categories 
in the diagram.
Spontaneous religion: the naturalness of (non-institutional) religion
We have seen that religion is increasingly prone to take a non-institutional 
rather than an institutional form in modern times, and that the sociology 
of religion has sought to explain this process as being a result of subjec-
tivization. Subjectivization theory suffers from one weakness, however, for 
it fails to explain why people who have not been socialized into institu-
tional religion would at all be attracted to religion in the first place. The 
religious impulse, which it simply assumes, needs to be substantiated. To 
do so adequately, we must combine a Weberian stream within the sociol-
ogy of religion that sees religion as an expression of human beings’ need 
for meaning, with a cognitive approach that sees religion as an expres-
sion of our predisposition for magical and animistic thinking. Despite the 
differences, both these theoretical schools perceive religion as something 
natural, that arises “spontaneously” from our human (biological and cogni-
tive) nature, and is only subsequently moulded socially through processes 
of institutionalization, rationalization, and so on. Well-knowing that new 
religious expressions are always formulated within a cultural and social 
context, I shall in what follows consider “spontaneous religion” as an ideal 
type of natural religion that has not yet been subject to cultural and social 
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constraints.10
Meerten Ter Borg has addressed the question of religion’s apparent 
naturalness, taking off from Thomas Luckmann’s (1967) notion that the 
human being is an “animal religiosum,” a religious animal. This is not to be 
taken to mean that human beings are religious because some divine power 
really exists, reveals itself, or guarantees cosmic order. Bracketing out such 
questions with a stance of methodological agnosticism, Luckmann and 
Ter Borg argue purely sociologically: as Luckmann puts it, human beings 
are capable of “transcendence,” i.e. they can transcend the here and now 
and can imagine past, future, ideal, and fictional states of being (1967). Ter 
Borg adds that this capability of transcendence leads humans to contem-
plate their own condition, their “finality” and “insignificance” (2008b, 129). 
Such reflection can give rise to a feeling of “anomie,” or as Ter Borg prefers 
to call it, “ontological insecurity” (2008b, 129). 
Ter Borg constructs this term as the opposite of Anthony Giddens’ 
“ontological security,” but he uses the term somewhat differently. Giddens 
(1984) optimistically assumes that people create a sense of ontological 
security through practical routines and communicative reinforcements of 
beliefs and values, and attributes no special role to religion in this process. 
Ter Borg adapts Giddens’ term to an anthropology inspired by Gehlen 
(1940), for whom the human being is a “Mängelwesen,” an incomplete 
animal whose instincts-less biological condition is one of chaos (and 
hence ontological insecurity). This biological condition must be tempered 
by socially constructed culture. Norms, rituals, and meaning-making of 
all kinds give humans instruments to live by and shield individuals and 
societies against ontological insecurity, but religious meaning-making, i.e. 
meaning-making that is claimed to be divinely sanctioned, does so most 
effectively. This is at least the case insofar as this divine entity appears real 
to the believer (Ter Borg, 2008b, 130–131). Though religion is both a likely 
reaction to ontological insecurity and a potent means to combat it, it does 
not arise by necessity. 
Ter Borg argues, contra Luckmann, that it is too much to consider the 
human being an animal religiosum. Luckmann is right to say that the 
capacity for transcendence (and hence for religion) is an anthropological 
constant, but that allows us only to identify the human being as an “animal 
transcendens” (Ter Borg 2008c, 232). It does not follow logically (and nor 
10. The term “spontaneous religion” is inspired in part by Hanegraaff ’s distinction 
between spontaneous and intellectual magic (1998, 269) and his notion of “sponta-
neous animism” (2003, 374).
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can it be observed empirically) that humans necessarily must use their 
capacity for transcendence to make religion (Ter Borg 2008c, 235).
For Weber, Luckmann, and Ter Borg it is the human need for existen-
tial meaning that constitutes the anthropological factor behind the social 
phenomenon of religion. I think it is correct to assume that such a “mean-
ing drive” exists, and that one of the potential and likely consequences of 
this cognitive mechanism is the emergence of spontaneous religion. But 
other mechanisms or dispositions play a role as well, some of which have 
been pointed out by cognitive scholars of religion, updating the funda-
mental insights of Tylor and Frazer.11 These cognitive scholars have dem-
onstrated that humans are natural animists, ascribing agency to artefacts 
(e.g., blaming the computer) and natural phenomena (e.g., seeing faces 
in the clouds), and spontaneous magicians, attributing causal power to 
thoughts and rituals and causal connections to things on the basis of simi-
larity (e.g., burning a photo to hurt a person) or contagion (e.g., burning a 
lock of hair to hurt a person).12 Even when we do not really believe that the 
computer has lost our data on purpose, and when we are too embarrassed 
to admit our hope that crossed fingers will actually help, we still engage in 
animist and magical cognition and action. Furthermore, people report a 
variety of spontaneously religious experiences such as synchronicity, lucid 
dreaming, and near-death experiences (cf. Cardeña, Lynn, and Krippner 
2000), providing yet another set of “building-blocks” (Taves 2009) for 
non-institutional religion.
As much as the very emergence of spontaneous religion is co-deter-
mined by universal cognitive dispositions, the form it subsequently takes 
is shaped by social and cultural factors. At times and places where institu-
tional religion exerts strong social control, new religious impulses are likely 
to be absorbed or suppressed by the dominant, institutional religion. Such 
conditions existed, for instance, in most of Northern Europe and North 
America between 1850 and 1950 (McGuire 2008, 41; Ter Borg 2008a, 
53). When institutional religion is weak, however, as has been the situ-
ation in the West since the 1960s, spontaneous religion can turn into all 
11. Some important recent works in the cognitive study of religion are Guthrie (1993), 
Boyer (2002), Whitehouse (2004), and Sørensen (2007).
12. I should make it clear that I consider magic to be an essential part of religion, indeed 
the part that has to do with the attribution of supernatural efficacy to thought or 
actions. The Catholic Eucharist, by this definition, is a splendid example of magic, 
combining (a) magic based on similarity and supernatural efficacy attributed to 
speech (turning wine into blood) and (b) magic based on contagion (transferring the 
power of the god to the devotees through consumption).
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sorts of things. It can add weight to the non-institutional religious circuit 
and begin processes of consolidation and routinization of its own, as we 
see with the revitalization of magic and animism in the guise of new age 
and neo-paganism. Or spontaneous religion can draw institutional reli-
gion back towards a position of “cognitively optimal” religion. According 
to Harvey Whitehouse (2004), the “doctrinal mode” of Western church 
religion involves fundamentally unnatural thinking and therefore requires 
strong socialization and frequent repetition of teachings to remain intact 
and successfully transmit its teachings. If these social reinforcement mech-
anisms weaken, people will tend to fall back on a more cognitively optimal, 
but theologically incorrect, mode of belief. That is exactly what has been 
happening within Christianity with Moralistic Therapeutic Deism stamp-
ing out orthodox theism. This shows that it is important to study and 
theorize spontaneous religion, not only because it is the most natural and 
fundamental form of religion and because it supplies many of the build-
ing blocks of non-institutional religion, but also because it constitutes an 
important part of the socio-cognitive dynamics of institutional religion.
Future directions in the sociology of non-institutional religion
In the two previous sections I have presented some of Ter Borg’s thoughts 
on non-institutional religion, discussed his position up against those of 
others, and added some observations of my own. I do not expect that I 
have convinced all my sociological readers to adopt a substantive defi-
nition of religion and to start co-operating with the cognitivists. And I 
reckon that my typology of modes of non-institutional religion will not 
be equally useful for all studies and purposes. But that does not matter. As 
long as I have poked, provoked, and stirred a bit I am satisfied, and I hope 
that others will be inspired to contribute further to our understanding of 
the constitution and foundation of non-institutional religion. Let me now 
finish off by pointing out three further issues that deserve the attention 
of the sociology of non-institutional religion, namely religious bricolage, 
modes of belief, and the internet.
Sociologists of religion have so far been satisfied to state that non-insti-
tutional religion is characterized by religious bricolage, but we still do not 
know how it works exactly, what kinds of sources can be used as building 
blocks, and what types of bricolage there are. It is well-known that sponta-
neous religion and dis-embedded elements from institutional religion are 
used as building blocks for religious bricolage, but a wide range of other 
“special things” (Taves 2009) can be used as well. A particularly important 
Future Directions in the Sociology of Non-Institutional Religion 565
© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012
group of special things is constituted by revered fictional books and films 
(e.g., Possamai 2005; 2012). Though fandom itself is not religion, it can be 
a source for religious bricolage, as in the case of Jediism which has arisen as 
a convergence of New Age religion and Star Wars fandom (Davidsen 2011). 
Religious bricolage can take place in various ways and on various lev-
els. A first distinction can be made between combinatory bricolage, i.e. an 
individual’s parallel engagement in different practices and traditions, and 
integrationist bricolage, where the bits and pieces are blended into a new 
whole. Integrationist bricolage can be analysed both on a conceptual level 
and on the level of ideology or local tradition. On the conceptual level, 
Olav Hammer (2001; 2008) has demonstrated how similar concepts can 
be equated through the process of “synomynization” (e.g., prana, ki, and 
the odic force are all “the same”), and how a concept can be reinterpreted 
or “domesticated” when dis-embedded from one context and re-embedded 
into another (e.g., reincarnation, which became a positive concept in the 
West). I have myself analysed the “identity bricolage” of contemporary, self-
identified Elves as an example of “conceptual blending” (Fauconnier and 
Turner, 2002; cf. Davidsen, in preparation). 
On the level of ideology, we can distinguish between different forms 
of “syncretism” depending on the relative input strength of the combined 
traditions. There exist at least three types, namely historical harmoniza-
tion, ideological framing, and what Egil Asprem has called “programmatic 
syncretism” (2007), the last two corresponding to domestication and syn-
onymization on the scale of ideology. While truly systematic ideological 
bricolage is possible only within institutional religion, “syncretic” religious 
organizations like the Theosophical Society and the Hermetic Order of 
the Golden Dawn have made a large number of synonymizations and 
domestications on the conceptual level available also for non-institutional 
religious bricoleurs.
A second issue that deserves closer scrutiny is the different modes that 
non-institutional religious action and cognition can take. Non-institutional 
religion is often casual, playful, or even ironic, rather than serious and for-
mal. Part of the field consists of “entertainment cults” (Possamai 2007) and 
“invented religions” (Cusack 2010). It can seem difficult to draw the line 
between religion and non-religion under such circumstances, especially 
when many non-institutional religious actors also turn out to have no firm 
beliefs, but only “hunches” (cf. McCutcheon 2012). These conditions are 
no different from institutional religion, however, and what McCutcheon 
calls religious hunches are nothing but the (immediate) beliefs that form 
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the core of religion and upon which religious action is based (cf. Luhrmann 
1989, 318). The public credal assertions that most people consider “beliefs” 
actually have more the character of rationalizations and legitimizations. 
The distinction between immediate belief and after-the-fact rationaliza-
tion is crucial, especially because many non-institutional religious ideas 
and practices possess less symbolic capital than institutional religion, and 
many religionists will therefore be embarrassed about their engagement 
and tend to tell the sociologist, say, that they only read horoscopes for 
entertainment, or do not really think they can communicate with their 
deceased mother. We should be equally careful not to “under-interpret” 
such defensive assertions as unbelief and not to “over-interpret” credal 
assertions of such ironical groups as the Church of the Flying Spaghetti 
Monster as belief. That said, it is worth investigating whether the binary 
distinction between belief and unbelief that I draw up here can be devel-
oped into a typology of “belief modes,” ranging from “play” to “conviction,” 
a typology that might also enable the study of how and when individuals 
slide from one mode to the other.
Finally, the internet deserves special attention. Since the mid-1990s, the 
internet has played a crucial role in the mobilization of non-institutional 
religion—leading, for instance, to the ten-doubling of the number of neo-
pagans during the 1990s (Lewis 2007) and to the rise of a “long tail” of 
small and specialized groups and networks, enabling a hitherto unknown 
variety of forms of non-institutional religious life. It has had many other 
effects as well, that we are only now beginning to understand. In a ground-
breaking study, Douglas Cowen (2005) pointed out that the internet can 
lead both to homogenization, because people plagiarize each other’s web-
sites, and to creative “open access religions,” in which new traditions are 
built in a co-operative, Wikipedia-like way.
How do we go about pursuing these issues? Quantitative studies and 
advanced statistics will obviously not do, but neither will interviews, for it 
is not people’s rationalization of their religious activity that we are after, 
but the patterns of that activity itself. There is only one way to get at that, 
and that is field-work. Since we want to shed light on theoretical issues 
(religious bricolage, the difference between play and religion, the impact 
of the internet, and many more) our field-work needs furthermore to be 
armed to the teeth with theory. This should not only be sociological (and 
anthropological) theory. The sociology of non-institutional religion has 
much to gain by engaging also (critically) with the cognitive study of reli-
gion. We do not have to take over the cognitive approach completely, of 
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course, but should use it as one “domesticated” building block, among oth-
ers, in our own theoretical bricolage.
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